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Sixteen	reasons	to	expect	just	another,	‘standard-
issue’	Tory	government
A	torrent	of	‘expert’	commentary	has	evaluated	positively	the	chances	of	a	Boris	Johnson	government
adopting	new,	‘one	nation’	policies	to	give	priority	to	the	interests	of	working	class	voters	and	‘left
behind’	communities	in	northern	or	midland	Britain.	Patrick	Dunleavy	enumerates	the	numerous
countervailing	reasons	to	expect	instead	that	this	government	will	be	very	similar	to	its	Conservative
predecessors	in	maintaining	the	inegalitarian	domestic	policies	of	recent	times.
The	UK’s	national	media	and	the	‘commentariate’	have	strong	interests	in	talking	up	the	prospects	of	a	Boris
Johnson	government	as	marking	a	new	direction	in	British	politics.	To	predict	just	‘more	of	the	same’	sells	fewer
newspapers.	So	it	is	little	wonder	that	the	Conservative	papers	have	maxed	out	on	delineating	the	imagined	policy
details	of	a	‘shining	path’	to	a	golden	future	that	Johnson’s	administration	will	herald.
Yet	quite	a	few	left-leaning,	non-aligned	and	academic	voices	have	also	found	it	plausible	that	a	Johnson
government	will	assign	much	greater	policy	weight	to	rebuilding	the	depressed	parts	of	northern	and	midlands
England	–	so	as	to	cement	and	retain	for	the	long-term	the	possibly	temporary	support	of	erstwhile	‘red	belt’	voters
there.	The	argument	goes	that	all	the	47	MPs	in	seats	gained	this	time	around,	and	many	more	previously	marginal
Tory	incumbents,	owe	their	Commons	position	to	Johnson’s	populist	ability	to	reach	audiences	previously	hostile	to
the	Conservatives’	message.	This	was	the	PM’s	personal	victory,	achieved	in	the	face	of	net	dissatisfaction	levels
with	the	government	of	-55%.
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The	new	cohorts	of	MPs	will	allegedly	be	a	powerful	lobby	for	the	interests	of	their	previously	neglected
communities,	their	voice	chiming	powerfully	with	the	PM’s	own	instincts	towards	a	more	interventionist	‘one	nation’
Toryism,	which	he	displayed	as	London	mayor	and	reiterated	in	the	election	campaign.	The	policy	consequences
supposed	to	follow	range	from	concluding	a	‘softer’	Brexit	deal	more	favourable	to	manufacturing	interests	(in	the
process	‘seeing	off’	the	hard-right	irreconcilables	of	the	European	Research	Group),	to	a	new	and	innovative
regional	policy	impetus,	and	a	‘softer’	line	on	public	services	and	welfare	funding	issues.
Enchanting	though	such	visions	of	a	more	generous	Conservatism	and	a	more	egalitarian	Britain	may	be,	there	are
many	good	reasons	why	they	are	unlikely	to	happen	–	some	structural,	and	others	political.
Structural	barriers
The	UK’s	economic,	institutional,	and	cultural	systems	impose	eight	major	constraints	that	make	for	only	a	limited
scope	of	government	action,	making	a	mockery	of	Dominic	Cummings’	allegedly	‘revolutionary’	policy	change
ambitions.
1.	 Brexit’s	depressing	economic	impacts	may	not	yet	have	become	visible	to	most	voters,	but	in	business
and	academia	they	are	already	clearly	at	work,	incrementally	eroding	the	UK’s	GDP,	our	attraction	for	foreign
direct	investment,	the	scope	for	future	economic	growth,	and	the	healthiness	of	the	government’s	tax	base.
2.	 The	triple	lock	on	taxes	in	the	Tory	manifesto	means	that	no	income	tax,	National	Insurance	or	VAT
increases	can	be	envisaged	for	the	next	Parliament.	The	corporation	tax	decrease	once	proposed	has
accordingly	been	scrapped	(for	now).	The	government	might	yet	deliver	some	progress	on	its	promise	to
make	the	FAANG	US	platform	companies	pay	some	alternative	to	corporation	tax	(evening	up	competition	for
Britain-only	businesses).	But	this	won’t	happen	with	any	kind	of	US	trade	deal.	Allied	with	post-Brexit
stagnation	influences,	tax	stasis	will	mean	continuing	pressure	on	government	budgets,	especially	grants	to
regions	and	localities.
3.	 Completely	deadweight	subsidies	to	agriculture	and	fisheries	will	transfer	to	the	UK	after	Brexit.	Tory
ministers	have	already	pledged	steady-state	funding	to	2025	and	will	be	under	immense	pressure	from	both
organized	lobbies	and	their	personal	contact	circles	and	land-owning	interests	to	accede	to	increased
payments	that	they	know	serve	no	purpose	economically.
4.	 Replacing	EU	support	for	R&D	will	be	very	difficult,	let	alone	finding	new	monies,	since	the	UK	typically
gained	far	more	funding	than	its	population	share	in	many	high	tech	areas	of	forefront	research.	The	loss	of
scale,	expertise,	and	collaboration	avenues	in	projects,	and	shifting	decision-making	back	to	Whitehall	from
the	greater	professionalism	of	EU	evaluations,	will	both	have	negative	effects.	The	lacklustre	history	of	UK
industrial	policy	shows	that	single-country	decisionmakers	are	particularly	likely	to	buy	into	a	disastrous
‘techno-nationalism’	that	typically	ends	not	with	a	bang	but	a	whimper.	Bringing	in	business	‘experts’	from	the
UK’s	depleted	(and	largely	defeatist)	manufacturing	base	(as	Cummings	proposes)	will	make	things	worse,	as
it	already	has	in	universities	(themselves	arguably	some	of	the	UK’s	strongest	economic	actors	now).
5.	 Most	previous	‘industrial’	strategies	(and	all	of	Cummings’	scientistic	fantasies	of	future	growth)	ignore	the
plain	fact	that	the	UK	is	80%	a	service	economy	now.	So	even	if	a	manufacturing	revival	was	achievable,	it
is	largely	irrelevant	to	jobs	and	the	health	of	the	largest	economic	sectors.	Services	follow	consumers,	and	so
won’t	resist	the	pull	of	the	dominant	south	east	and	London.	The	exodus	of	brightest	and	most	entrepreneurial
people	from	the	UK’s	more	peripheral	regions	is	not	yet	on	a	Latvian	scale	(which	has	lost	23%	of	its
population	since	1990).	But	the	effects	on	educational	morale	and	entrepreneurial	and	civic	culture	are	poor.
6.	 In	dozens	of	Midlands	and	northern	towns	the	three	largest	local	employers	are	state	organizations	–	the
NHS	general	hospital,	the	local	authority,	and	the	university.	Often	they	are	the	only	local	centres	of	expertise
on	how	to	manage	large	organizations	in	a	sea	of	small	firms	with	limited	capital	and	time	horizons,	and	a
welter	of	own-account	workers.	Yet	Tory	ministers	and	MPs	have	long	ignored	or	denigrated	public	sector
managers,	convinced	they	have	nothing	to	contribute	to	local	business	or	organizational	flourishing.
7.	 Amazon	(and	other	digital	suppliers)	will	carry	on	eating	high	street	businesses	and	those	dependent
on	footfall	unless	the	government	takes	drastic	action	to	rebalance	taxes	on	or	regulation	of	their	current
operations.	Ministers	may	try	to	combat	the	hollowing	out	of	most	depressed	town	centres	by	freeing	up
planning	restriction	on	former	commercial	properties.	But	that	normally	just	extends	residential	areas	and
fosters	more	town-cramming	by	local	authorities	–	it	does	nothing	to	diversify	or	strengthen	the	employment
base.
8.	 The	new	government	has	few	significant	regional	or	place-based	policies	to	draw	on	–	there	is	no	‘magic
pot’	of	proven	strategies	that	have	not	already	been	tried.	And	Conservative	ministers	are	often	hostile	to
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those	strategies	that	have	the	best	records	of	working	–	such	as	public	sector-lead	redevelopment,	growing
‘cultural	districts’	to	energize	cities,	or	allowing	local	areas	to	carve	out	their	own	distinctive	paths	growing
different	‘industrial	districts’	with	agglomeration	economies	–	always	anathema	also	to	Whitehall.
Political	reasons	favouring	standard	Tory	policies
Imagine,	for	a	moment,	that	we	lived	in	a	well-funded	and	well-founded	British	state,	with	a	thriving	economy	and
tax	base.	There	are	still	numerous	political	reasons	for	scepticism	about	whether	a	Tory	government	could	even
then	implement	from	Whitehall	the	‘one	nation’	policies	being	so	eagerly	trailed.
9.	 The	new	Conservative	MPs	will	have	little	political	clout	compared	with	the	established	hierarchies	of	the
Tory	party	and	parliamentary	group.	Unversed	in	the	byzantine	ways	of	Erskine	May,	they	will	have	to	spend
their	first	two	years	just	learning	their	way	around	Westminster.	And	as	‘marginal’	MPs,	their	Commons
careers	are	likely	to	be	short,	and	their	influence	on	policymaking	slender	–	since	they	will	have	to	assign
much	of	their	time	to	‘nursing’	their	constituency	position.	If	it	later	looks	unlikely	that	they	will	retain	their
seats,	the	‘realpolitik’	of	Tory	power	politics	will	cut	their	influence	further.	Their	temporary	voices	could	easily
be	discounted	to	zero	if	they	are	foreseeably	on	the	way	out	of	politics	anyway.
10.	 Johnson	has	little	freedom	of	manoeuvre	right	now	to	reorganize	his	current	Cabinet	of	Brexit
‘extremists’.	Leaks	suggest	that	he	will	make	a	few	instant	changes	to	last	until	the	31	January	date	for	UK
‘exit’.	Then	in	February	2020	he	will	proclaim	‘Mission	Accomplished’	and	scrap	the	(hopeless)	Department	for
Exiting	the	EU	(moving	most	powers	into	the	Cabinet	Office,	where	they	should	have	been	all	along).
According	to	the	Sunday	Times,	he	may	also	merge	the	Department	for	International	Development	into	the
Foreign	Office	(although	this	failed	to	work	before).	And	he	may	absorb	the	(also	provenly	hopeless)
Department	for	International	Trade	into	the	Department	of	Business.	Perhaps	the	immigration	function	may	be
taken	away	from	the	(dysfunctional)	Home	Office	and	given	to	a	new	single-focus	ministry.	In	all	these	plans,
notice	that	the	dominant	orientation	is	outward,	to	the	trading	world	where	the	UK	will	desperately	need	new
markets	to	replace	the	Brexit-induced	losses,	not	inwards	to	equalizing	UK	life	conditions.
11.	 A	far	right-wing	agenda	is	still	live	amongst	Conservative	elites.	The	thinking	behind	the	2012	Britannia
Unchained	intra-party	manifesto	is	alive	and	well,	and	most	of	the	current	Cabinet	are	firm	adherents	to
radical	anti-statist	thinking.	From	mid-February	onwards,	secure	in	their	positions,	those	Cabinet	ministers
who	can	survive	in	their	chairs	will	be	barons	within	their	own	departments	–	free	to	pursue	their	agendas
beneath	the	limited	radar	of	Number	10.	With	the	erstwhile	Remainers	in	the	Conservative	ranks	either
expelled	by	Johnson’s	pre-election	gambits,	or	caught	up	in	the	‘spiral	of	silence’	that	has	completely	side-
lined	liberal	Tory	voices,	the	right’s	task	in	stiffening	pro-privatization	policies	has	never	been	easier.	They
may	also	draw	on	substantial	support	amongst	the	new	wave	of	Tory	MPs	themselves,	many	of	whom	have
been	radicalized	into	simplistic	ideological	views	by	their	long	toil	against	the	odds	in	their	localities.
12.	 All	the	Tory	factions	have	especially	set	their	face	against	‘entrepreneurial	state’	solutions,	so	it	will	be
hard	to	induce	them	to	recognize	the	need	for	constructive	public	development	(and	ownership)	of
infrastructures,	or	state	sponsorship	of	pre-collaborative	research	relevant	to	the	UK’s	services	economy
(rather	than	some	industrial/scientistic	renaissance	that	will	never	happen).
13.	 The	civil	service	will	be	distracted	by	urgent	and	difficult	Brexit	implementation	work.	By	April	2020
there	will	be	27,000	civil	servants	doing	nothing	else	but	working	on	Brexit-related	changes	to	administrative
and	IT	systems.	In	autumn	2019,	Operation	Yellowhammer	(getting	ready	for	Johnson’s	and	Cummings’
aborted	‘hard	Brexit’)	wasted	millions	of	pounds	on	measures	that	were	never	implemented,	drawing	in
thousands	of	civil	servants	from	across	the	department	spectrum	(and	across	the	globe).	Add	that	waste	to
the	three	years	of	policy	stasis	that	Brexit	has	already	caused	and	the	post-austerity	UK	state	is	uniquely
fragile	and	unable	to	assure	basic	functions	–	as	the	chronic	Whitehall	inaction	underlying	the	2017	Grenfell
Tower	catastrophe	vividly	illustrated.
14.	 Most	British	premiers	become	fascinated	by	striding	the	world	stage,	as	Tony	Blair	did	to	the	destruction
of	his	own	governments.	In	the	right-wing	dining	clubs	and	think	tanks	of	London	there	are	still	numerous	Tory
ministers	and	MPs	obsessed	with	‘projecting	power’	overseas	–	hence	the	two	UK	aircraft	carriers	(with
almost	none	of	the	essential	protective	destroyers)	that	Cummings	so	detests.	Since	the	UK	can	actually	do
nothing	alone	internationally,	a	lot	rests	on	US	decisionmaking.	So	far,	Trump	has	avoided	most	overseas
adventures	(apart	from	re-sending	troops	to	Saudi	Arabia,	despite	the	adverse	consequences	last	time	this
was	tried).	But	it	is	likely	only	a	matter	of	time	before	some	new	involvement	(beyond	the	current	Syria	roles)
is	engineered	by	an	MoD	hierarchy	anxious	to	restart	big	league	spending.	Will	Johnson	want	to	focus	hard
on	mundane	domestic	issues,	resisting	the	siren	voices	to	maximize	the	UK’s	‘weight	in	the	world’,	either
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alongside	the	USA	or	perhaps	the	French?
15.	 Johnson	will	be	less	prominent	on	the	world	stage	than	any	PM	in	recent	decades.	All	the	European
Council	meetings	will	be	excised	from	his	calendar	at	a	stroke,	and	he	will	be	Canadian-level	spare	wheel	at
G7	or	G20	meetings,	reduced	to	hustling	in	the	corridors	for	trade	deals	and	touring	regions	where	UK	trade	is
inherently	limited	by	geographical	distance.	His	temptation	to	counteract	the	UK’s	marginalization	by	some
dramatic	(early	Churchillian	style)	adventure	will	be	strong.
16.	 The	government’s	term	will	last	six	to	eighteen	months	less	than	five	years.	Because	the	election
happened	in	December,	Johnson	has	actually	only	got	a	maximum	of	four	and	a	half	years	in	power	–	until
May/June	2024.	But	delaying	an	election	that	long	risks	boxing	the	government	in	to	potentially	holding	it
when	its	popularity	has	drained	down.	By	2022	at	the	latest,	the	PM	will	have	regained	control	of	election
timing,	as	Nick	Clegg’s	fixed-term	elections	law	is	finally	scrapped.	So,	just	as	most	governments	previously
lasted	only	four	years	within	the	notional	five-year	term,	so	there	will	be	strong	pressures	on	the	PM	to	avoid
risking	a	‘lame	duck’	final	year	by	going	back	to	voters	after	only	three	and	a	half	years	–	in	May/June	2023.
Supposing	some	regional	policy	initiatives	have	actually	happened,	they	will	barely	have	started	to	work	by	then.
Probably	even	the	NHS	pledge	will	not	yet	have	produced	noticeably	beneficial	results.	So	the	incentives	for	the
government	will	instead	be	to	prioritize	‘easy	win’	progress	on	‘buzz’	issues	for	solidifying	their	core	support	–	by
cracking	down	on	immigration,	locking	up	criminals	for	longer,	fixing	a	few	million	potholes	in	roads,	and	flying	the
flag	on	some	allegedly	‘low	risk’	military	adventure	overseas.	The	Johnson	government	is	thus	overwhelmingly	likely
to	resemble	its	Tory	predecessors.
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